A Post-Colonial and Post-Soviet World

Intro­duc­tion to IJWP, June 2008
This issue begins by dis­cussing the elim­i­na­tion of the effects of colo­nial­ism and the Soviet Union which were each, in their own way, the result of empire-building. The idea of rul­ing over the lands of other peo­ple has been around as long as recorded human his­tory. While it runs counter to the notion that peo­ple have the right to pur­sue their own des­tiny, it is an idea that dies hard and con­tin­u­ally resur­faces when checks and bal­ances in power are not put in place that would deter the force of conquest.

Suc­ces­sion in For­eign Pol­icy in the Post-Soviet World
Our first arti­cle, by Alexan­der Nikitin on “Russ­ian For­eign Pol­icy in the Frag­mented Post-Soviet Space” looks at the suc­ces­sion or tran­si­tion of for­eign pol­icy in the geo­graphic area vacated by the death, not of a sin­gle polit­i­cal leader, but of an entire polit­i­cal régime.

The Com­mon­wealth of Inde­pen­dent States (CIS), which was formed imme­di­ately after the col­lapse of the Soviet sys­tem over the same ter­ri­tory, has proven an interim struc­ture that the author feels should die a quiet death as the var­i­ous enti­ties cov­er­ing the fringes of the old empire begin to for­mu­late new sets of regional rela­tions with their neighbors.

In this con­text, Russia’s for­eign pol­icy is seen more as regional lead­er­ship than a global super­power. Nitikin traces the recent his­tory of Russ­ian for­eign pol­icy in the post-Soviet period and high­lights the role of the Col­lec­tive Secu­rity Treaty Orga­ni­za­tion (CSTO), which has evolved in con­nec­tion to the rise of the Tal­iban in Afghanistan and the increased influ­ence of Iran in Cen­tral Asia.

Nitikin argues that nei­ther Rus­sia nor the West has ade­quately adjusted for­eign pol­icy goals to the new geopo­lit­i­cal issues in the world. He con­cludes by list­ing a set of for­eign pol­icy objec­tives that are rec­om­mended for imple­men­ta­tion after the 2008 pres­i­den­tial elec­tion in Russia.

Polit­i­cal Suc­ces­sion in the Post-Colonial World
Our sec­ond arti­cle, by Ade­wale Banjo, dis­cusses the issue of polit­i­cal suc­ces­sion in West Africa. It addresses the var­i­ous meth­ods used to per­pet­u­ate power in post-colonial soci­eties that have become democ­ra­cies or republics on paper, but not in cul­tural prac­tice. The story of suc­ces­sion in Togo, well told by the author, is a clas­sic exam­ple of the tac­tics that can be used to pro­mote a fam­ily dynasty in a coun­try that is in the­ory a post-colonial democracy.

After attain­ing inde­pen­dence from France in 1960, Syl­vanus Olym­pio ruled Togo until, dur­ing the Cold War, Gnass­ingbe Eyadema seized power in a blood­less coup in 1967. After the Cold War, in 1991, on the crest of a new wave of democ­ra­ti­za­tion, polit­i­cal par­ties were legal­ized. How­ever, in the next three elec­tions Eyadema was repeat­edly elected amid charges of polit­i­cal repres­sion and elec­tion fraud. He report­edly salted away over $3 bil­lion in per­sonal accounts before he died.

After Gnass­ingbe Eyadema’s death, his son, Faure, used mil­i­tary force and the bribery of var­i­ous offi­cials to seize power by non-constitutional means, con­tin­u­ing the rule as a fam­ily dynasty. The arti­cle is a chron­i­cle of all the tricks and tac­tics used by those in power to retain the con­trol of a coun­try rather than allow­ing demo­c­ra­tic ideals to be realized.

The role of a mod­ern polit­i­cal con­sti­tu­tion is to pro­vide a frame­work within which rule of law, not rule of force or cor­rup­tion, can pre­vail. Orderly polit­i­cal suc­ces­sion under the rule of law requires the insti­tu­tions entrusted with enforc­ing the rule of law to be more loyal to the con­sti­tu­tion than to the lead­ers of the régime.

Good gov­er­nance requires that the polit­i­cal sys­tem enable the most qual­i­fied peo­ple, not the best con­nected through influ­ence, to rise to top posi­tions of lead­er­ship. From the Roman Empire to the con­tem­po­rary United States, even the most influ­en­tial con­sti­tu­tional gov­ern­ments have appointed or elected “heirs to the throne,” not always with the best success.

Rein­ing in Dis­si­dent States
Our third arti­cle, on North Korea by Yutaka Okuyama, exam­ines what it can be like for legit­i­mate gov­ern­ments to try to nego­ti­ate with regimes that have entrenched fam­ily dynas­ties that have ruled by force rather than con­sti­tu­tional law.

Okuyama looks at the prob­lem of whether and how dis­si­dent states like North Korea can be brought into a civil rela­tion­ship with the world com­mu­nity and cease func­tion­ing as a pariah state. North Korea is both a post-colonial state in which a fam­ily dynasty has emerged with absolute power, and a post-Soviet client state that lost its main patron and defender. It has con­tin­ued a ruth­less inde­pen­dent path, oppress­ing its peo­ple and threat­en­ing vio­lence to get its way in the world.

Okuyama dis­cusses the dilemma such states pose to the world at large and notes that two meth­ods, mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion and peace­ful coöper­a­tion seem to be the only options avail­able. Over the past sev­eral years there have been many attempts at peace­ful coöper­a­tion with­out suc­cess in either help­ing the peo­ple or break­ing the tyran­ni­cal and para­noid hold of the cur­rent régime.

After dis­cussing dis­il­lu­sion­ment and failed attempts by South Korea, the inter­na­tional com­mu­nity, by Wash­ing­ton, and by NGOs in attempts to assist the inte­gra­tion of North Korea into the com­mu­nity of nations, the author con­cludes that a vari­a­tion on the car­rot and stick is required. He sug­gests that large pow­ers like the United States imple­ment long-term for­eign pol­icy strate­gies rather than short-term polit­i­cal objec­tives. These strate­gies should offer enough to the régime to make it worth­while tak­ing the assis­tance, while includ­ing mea­sures that ensure the aid actu­ally reaches the target.

What is the Mind?
Our fourth arti­cle, “What is the Mind?” might not seem directly related to peace, but we have included this con­tri­bu­tion by Tom Kando because he argues that “minds” are a prod­uct of the social, cul­tural, and his­tor­i­cal expe­ri­ence of peo­ple. They tran­scend the brain and can­not be under­stood by study­ing the genetic makeup of brain cells any more than a sys­tem of lan­guage can be under­stood by exam­in­ing the mouths of the peo­ple who speak it.

Of course, one needs a brain in order to have a con­scious thought, just like one needs a mouth to speak a word. The “nature vs. nur­ture” debates thus can be cor­re­lated with the ages-old mind-brain prob­lem. It fol­lows, for exam­ple, that if sui­cide bomb­ing occurs in some soci­eties but not oth­ers, it is a cul­tural prob­lem related to the mind and not a genetic prob­lem related to the brain. Solu­tions have more to do with social­iza­tion and learn­ing than with phys­i­cal restraint or chem­i­cal inhibitors. It might fur­ther seem that even uncon­scious emo­tions like love and hatred—that pro­mote peace and war—are prod­ucts of learn­ing, the results of devel­oped attach­ments or antipathies based on social experience.

Kando’s con­clu­sion is hope­ful for peace researchers, for if the mind is a prod­uct of learn­ing, then war is not an inevitable prod­uct of nature to which humans are con­signed. This is addi­tional sup­port for the psy­chol­o­gists who issued the Seville State­ment in 1986 and the idea of “build­ing a cul­ture of peace” dis­cussed by Lisa Reber-Rider in our last issue (March, 2008, p. 73).